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Abstract 
This article introduces the special issue on climate adaptation and institutions. Economic 
accounts of climate adaptation have stressed its collective action nature and the limits of 
standard economic approaches to the matter. Governance accounts, on their part, have 
shown that adaptation does not always happen when it is expected. Against this 
background, institutional economics has the potential to shed light on those societal 
processes and collective mechanisms leading to and shaping adaptation (or the absence of 
it). The selection of articles contributing to this special issue shows that climate adaptation 
can indeed be explored successfully through institutional economics, and that doing so fits 
well within the institutional economics agenda. Some recommendations for future research 
are provided at the end. 
1. Background and Rationale 
This special issue was envisioned for the first time at the 2013 “European Climate Change 
Adaptation (ECCA)” conference in Hamburg, Germany, after a conference session on 
institutional analysis and climate adaptation. In the years that followed, a longer 
  
conversation took place across various scientific events in Europe and North America, 
exploring the potential of institutional economics to advance our present understanding of 
climate adaptation. Three main considerations motivated the process. 
 
First, standard economic accounts of climate adaptation have pointed at problems 
connected with public goods, moral hazard and adverse selection, leading to both market 
and government failure (e.g. Mendelsohn 2006; Osberghaus et al. 2010; IPCC 2014), limiting 
the ability of market processes to address the challenges posed by climate change (Scrieciu 
et al. 2013; Surminski 2013), and challenging the applicability of those policy instruments in 
the economist’s toolbox (Heuson et al. 2012; Fankhauser and Soare 2013). This, alone, is a 
clear call for an institutional economics approach to adaptation, as institutional economics 
transcends the market-state dichotomy (Ostrom 1990). 
 
A second motivation for an institutional economics analysis of climate adaptation lies in the 
findings of governance scholars, who stress the ubiquitous and multi-faceted character of 
“barriers to adaptation” (Biesbroek et al. 2013; Eisenack et al. 2014). Expectations about a 
swift and straightforward adaptation to a changing climate may be essentially misplaced, 
since those rules shaping political, social and economic interactions – that is, institutions 
(North 1991) – often stand in the way. As a result, institutions and collective action have 
featured early on in the study of how individuals and society deal with the end of a 
stationary climate (Miller et al. 1997; Adger 2003), and prominently so. 
 
Third, a large body of institutional economics analyses addressing climate adaptation is 
missing. Institutional economics is concerned with those rules around which social 
interaction is structured, focusing on how such rules come about and how they change 
(Hodgson 1998; 2006). Change, however, was hardly ever addressed in the context of a 
changing climate. Only recently, scholars have started to address the very question, whether 
climate change is amenable to, and poses new questions for institutional economics (e.g. 
Libecap 2011; Berman et al. 2012; Araral 2013; Marshall 2013). So far, sophisticated and 
critical applications of institutional economics knowledge aimed at answering climate 
adaptation questions (e.g. Roggero 2015; Eisenack 2016) have been few and far between. In 
other words, there’ a gap to fill. 
 
In summary, in the face of a clear demand for insights on the institutional economics of 
climate adaptation, supply has been short thus far. Appearing on the Journal of Institutional 
Economics, this special issue is a first attempt at engaging the institutional economics 
audience in order to fill the gap between said demand and supply. However, we believe, 
institutional economists will only respond to our invitation if: 1) climate adaptation presents 
puzzles institutional economics can solve; and 2) solving such puzzles fits well within, and 
possibly advances the institutional economics agenda. Addressing these two points is the 
aim of the present text. 
 
This introduction is structured as following: the next section sets out by laying down a basic 
understanding of climate adaptation, highlighting the core traits of its institutional 
dimension as they emerge from the adaptation literature. It then proceeds to link key issues 
in climate adaptation to the institutional economics scholarship, with particular reference to 
the institutional change literature. Some suggestions for future research provide a 
conclusion. 
  
 
2. Overview of the literature 
Climate change, adaptation, and institutions 
Weather conditions in any particular place and time encompass a set of physical parameters 
such as temperature, precipitation, humidity, wind, and air pressure. The climate represents 
the variation of these parameters over time – a variation which shows, at present, cyclical 
intra-annual variation (e.g. the seasons) around a rather stable overall pattern. In short, the 
weather may change from day to day and from week to week, but overall the climate is 
stable or “stationary” in any given geographical region. Climate change research addresses 
the end of such stationary character of the climate (Smit et al. 2000). 
 
Geological records show that climate has changed significantly across the eras due to various 
natural causes. Contrary to this anthropogenic , climate change  is caused by greenhouse gas 
emissions into the atmosphere, mostly due to human use of fossil fuels – arguably the single 
most important enabling factor for the industrial revolution (Kander et al. 2017; Mertzanis 
2018). Mitigating climate change implies limiting and prospectively phasing out fossil fuels. 
As of today, though, too much greenhouse gases have been released into the atmosphere 
for it to remain stationary. The climate has already changed and will change further in the 
future (IPCC 2014). 
 
Against this background, climate change adaptation describes all individual and societal 
actions aimed at adjusting to the experienced or expected climate change impacts (Smit and 
Wandel 2006; Eisenack and Stecker 2012). These encompass physical measures, such as 
flood-walls to avoid inundations and irrigation systems to make up for shorter rainfall. The 
technical and infrastructural dimension of climate adaptation does not exhaust the set of 
potential and necessary adjustments to different climatic conditions, for two reasons. First, 
physical measures won’t always be able to fully off-set the impacts of a changing climate, 
(Dow et al. 2013; Felgenhauer 2015) thus requiring a change in practices and habits. Second, 
technical and infrastructural solutions are themselves embedded in a broader network of 
human habits and practices: implementing infrastructural solutions therefore requires 
adjustments in human habits and practices (Adger et al. 2009). 
 
Against this state of affairs, adaptation scholars have framed the societal dimension of 
adapting to climate change by borrowing heavily from the literature on common pool 
resources and socio-ecological systems (Dietz et al. 2003; Ostrom 2007; Folke et al. 2005; 
Adger et al. 2005), arguably in light of the existing links between the respective scientific 
communities (Janssen et al. 2006). Scholars have been particularly successful in highlighting 
the collective-action nature of adaptation (Adger 2003; Bisaro and Hinkel 2016), and raising 
the question of suitable institutional designs for that (Huntjens et al. 2012). By doing so, 
scholars have highlighted the challenges of bringing about adaptation: a large body of 
literature on barriers to adaptation (Moser and Ekstrom 2010; Eisenack et al. 2014) shows 
that adaptation may well not come about even when it is expected – and that for explicitly 
institutional reasons (Oberlack 2016). 
 
Institutional economics in the context of climate adaptation 
In light of the above, advancing our present understanding of the institutional economics of 
climate adaptation consists in unravelling collective action in complex social dilemmas, 
  
exploring present and alternative institutional designs, and unlocking social and institutional 
barriers to change – all that in a context of changing biophysical conditions, and with 
implications spanning across long time frames. Doing so may be rewarding for the 
institutional economist for two main reasons: 1) biophysical conditions have been 
comparatively understudied; and 2) it fits well the research agenda on institutional change. 
 
Concerning the first point, it’s important to recall that institutional economics, as a branch of 
economics, has a primary interest in explaining differentials in economic growth (Hodgson 
1998, Langlois 2007). It does so as a function of institutional determinants such as property 
rights (North and Thomas 1977; Acemoglu et al. 2005), legal systems (Buchanan et al. 2014), 
mental models (Denzau and North 1994), or cultural traits (Bowles 1998; Hodgson 1998). 
Consideration for the biophysical underpinnings of such determinants was not part of the 
original research agenda of institutional economics. It emerged only later, arguably as a by-
product of the study of public goods (Coase 1960; Olson 1965; Hardin 1968). Indeed, the 
path-breaking work of Ostrom (1990) starts precisely as a critique of Hardin’s (1968) analysis 
of common-pool resources – and represents a milestone in the institutional study of socio-
ecological systems. 
 
At the interface between the biophysical world and institutions, three lines of inquiry can be 
distinguished. Institutional ecological economics (Paavola and Adger 2005); nature-related 
transactions; and the study of common-pool resources, which later evolved into the study of 
socio-ecological systems. Concerning the first of the three lines, Vatn (2005) stresses the 
ecological interdependencies between environmental resources, and the “radical 
uncertainty” surrounding them. These considerations are however linked to institutions only 
with respects to how human, economic activities deal with their biophysical underpinnings. 
No implications are drawn about how institutions themselves are shaped by the biophysical 
world they are embedded with. 
 
By blending elements of agricultural and transaction costs economics, the line of research on 
nature-related transactions makes a step forward in theses respects. Stressing the 
distinction between managing man-made, engineered systems (as for industry), and steering 
biological processes (agriculture), Hagedorn (2008) points at the different requirements for 
the corresponding institutional arrangements. Progress has been made concerning the key 
biophysical attributes of such systems (Thiel et al. 2012; Thiel et al. 2016), and how these 
match with particular institutional arrangements. Little is known, though, about how such 
attributes shape those mechanisms behind institutional performance, and affect 
institutional change. On this topic, the contribution to this issue by Roggero and Thiel (2017) 
proposes some steps forward. 
 
Lastly, the study of common pool resources bears the legacy of the standard economics 
approach to public goods, prescribing specific institutional arrangements (individual 
property rights) on the basis of resource characteristics (rivalry and excludability). Common 
pool resource scholars successfully challenged such prescriptions. Addressing common 
property and common management regimes, they have shown the importance of context 
specificity, which does include biophysical conditions. Efforts to go beyond rivalry and 
excludability (e.g. Schlager et al. 1994; Constanza et al. 2001) have been made through the 
diverse applications of the Ostrom Social-Ecological-Systems framework (Hinkel et al. 2015), 
  
but so far no accepted and theoretically underpinned set of variables has been found to hold 
across diverse applications (Vogt et al. 2015). 
 
As the above makes it clear that much still has to be done in order to achieve a solid 
understanding of how change in biophysical conditions trigger changes in institutions. In the 
context of climate change, catching up in these respects may be rewarding. Outside the 
realm of “institutions (strictly) as equilibria” (see Hindriks and Guala 2015 and Aoki 2017 for 
an overview), institutional reasoning has a teleological dimension: institutions fulfill certain 
purposes (Bromley 2006). Most of these purposes arguably come about in the physical world 
and may thus be predicated upon particular climatic conditions, which are due to change. 
Climate change can thus reveal to which extent particular institutions are still able to 
perform satisfactorily under changed circumstances, and which ones instead will collapse 
(Young 2010). 
 
Concerning the second point – how climate change may further the institutional economics 
agenda – the emphasis the adaptation literature puts on barriers to adaptation recalls 
several themes within the institutional change literature. More specifically, scholars have 
gone at great lengths to isolate and classify barriers to adaptation (Lehmann et al. 2013, 
Oberlack 2016), but these are either reported, or postulated whenever expected 
adaptations do not come about. There is thus a lack of insight on those mechanisms causing 
adaptation processes to halt and/or not to deliver (Biesbroek et al. 2013; Bisaro and Hinkel, 
2016). On their part, institutional economics scholars have explored many such mechanisms, 
unravelling the role of e.g. vested interests (Acemoglu et al. 2005; Aoki 2017; Sherer and Lee 
2012), unintended effects (Sherer 2017; Rutherford 1984), cognition (Fox-Wolfgramm et al. 
1998; Blyth 2001; Buchanan et al. 2014) and institutional interplay (Hall and Thielen 2009; 
Pohlner 2016) can have in the persistence of suboptimal arrangements. 
 
Particularly worthwhile mentioning in these respects is the case of incremental change. 
Incremental change is still an open question even within the institutional scholarship (Fox-
Wolfram et al. 1998, Beland 2007). Particularly challenging about it is the fact of lying exactly 
at the conceptual boundary between stability and change, casting doubts on whether it 
represents continuity with past arrangements (as opposed to change), or whether it should 
be regarded as a specific instance of change (as opposed to stability of past arrangements). 
Most crucially, it may cause change to be overlooked or underestimated (Streek and Thelen 
2005): looking for transformative change in situations where incremental change is at play is 
bound to produce false negatives. 
 
In these respects, exploring adaptation to climate may provide institutional economists with 
a suitable context in which to explore and further refine the very meaning of change. Two 
aspects seem particularly promising. First, barriers to adaptation may in certain instances 
prove to be instances of incremental change, where adaptation is overlooked because of 
expectations of transformative change. Second, climate change impacts manifest themselves 
both in incremental and abrupt ways, raising questions on what sort of adaptation is 
necessary under which circumstances (Kates et al. 2012). 
 
  
3. Overview of the contributions to the special issue 
Considerations about vested interests, unintended effects, cognition, institutional interplay, 
incremental change and biophysical conditions all feature, in different combinations, among 
the contributions to the present special issue. Not surprisingly, most analyses take a 
comparative approach, with about half of them engaging in mid-N explorations and putting 
thus a strong emphasis on variation among arrangements and their contextual 
underpinnings. The link to socio-ecological systems and the study of the commons is also 
evident, with both Institutional Analysis and Development framework and Social-Ecological 
Systems framework featuring at the center of two respective analysis, and further two 
analyses centered on cooperation and transaction costs. 
 
Roggero et al. (2017) address the intersection between the adaptation literature and the one 
on common pool resources. They explore the adaptation literature through the lens of the 
IAD framework, performing a systematic literature review of IPCC-referenced articles. They 
thus assess the consideration adaptation scholars give to different aspects of institutional 
analysis. Results show a strong focus on collective choice and on adaptation by public actors, 
with an emphasis on rules in use, social interactions and, to a lesser extent, attributes of the 
community. Research gaps emerge instead concerning operational and constitutional choice, 
private adaptation, physical interactions and biophysical conditions. 
 
Bergsma (2017) examines the role of experts in the introduction of spatial planning 
considerations for dealing with floods. Central to her analysis is the paradigm shift taking 
place in the realm of river basin management, moving away from an understanding of total 
safety from floods, and towards the acknowledgement that floods do happen even against 
the best infrastructure. Such a change in understanding of the role and capabilities of flood 
protection infrastructure leads to flood risk arrangements that have profound distributional 
implications. In this context, the analysis links the features of such arrangements to the role 
of expert knowledge, mediated by institutional and political circumstances. It does so with 
reference to flood protection in the US and in the Netherlands, providing an explanation to 
the stark differences in arrangements that can be observed between the two cases. 
 
Gawel et al. (2016) take a Public Choice perspective in order to address barriers to efficient 
public climate adaptation. By doing so, they link the presence of suboptimal arrangements to 
the vested interests of specific actors. Specifically, they distinguish various dimensions of 
public adaptation and investigate how the self-interest of voters, pressure groups, 
bureaucrats and politicians may affect adaptation decisions, diverging from a theoretical 
efficient public adaptation. They then illustrate their findings with reference to public 
responses to major flood disasters in Germany, showing how these reflect the incentive 
structure of concerned stakeholders and their political interaction. 
 
Villamayor-Tomas (2017) addresses cooperative responses to disturbances in a selection of 
irrigation associations in Spain. Relying on transaction costs and collective action theories, 
the article links different, mainly physical attributes of the disturbances to the cooperative 
dimension of the responses by the irrigation associations. The analysis is based on the coding 
of association records, performing a mid-N, Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Surprisingly, 
results show that two alternative pathways are sufficient for the emergence of cooperation 
responses: one which is congruent with transaction costs theory; the other supporting 
  
relational theory. Most importantly, though, the analysis shows that specific combinations of 
physical characteristics of the disturbance at stake lead to different collective responses. 
 
Oberlack and Eisenack (2017) raise the question of how barriers to adaptation arise and 
address it through a collective action perspective. Focusing on “archetypes” of barriers in 
collective action processes, they search for evidence of mechanisms causing resistance to 
change and suboptimal arrangements to persist. They do so through a meta-analysis of 26 
selected case studies of adaptation in the realm of water governance and river basin 
management. They re-appearing patterns they identify cover issues connected with 
institutional interplay, uncertainty and vested interests, relating specifically to coordination 
gaps, path dependencies, zero-sum games, uncertainties and competing priorities. Results 
show that the challenges maintaining collective action under climate change arise from the 
attributes of the actors and from pre-existing institutions, less so from the biophysical 
characteristics of the adaptation measures at stake. 
 
Roggero and Thiel (2017) explore collective action within local administrations addressing 
adaptation to climate change. The authors focus here on differentiating the type of 
institutional change observed as a function of pre-existing arrangements. Based on 
transaction costs economics, they unravel the role of so-called integrative and segregative 
institutions in the way different functional branches within an administration respond to 
climate change collectively rather than independently. Through a comparative analysis of 19 
climate sensitive local administrations in Germany, they show how integrative institutions 
lead to incremental change, adjusting existing arrangements in order to accommodate 
adaptation. Under segregative institutions, however, administrations show a more 
transformative type of institutional change, conditional however to past experiences of 
extreme weather events. 
 
4. Looking ahead: directions for future research 
The different articles contributing to this special issue show how institutional economics can 
be successfully applied to climate adaptation settings. They also show a good fit between 
the research agenda of institutional economics, linking performance and change of given 
institutions to e.g. vested interests, cognition, interplay, and transaction costs, and the type 
of problems addressed in a climate adaptation setting. Yet again, the selected articles are 
little more than a showcase for the institutional economics of climate adaptation, and they 
are far from exhausting the matter. 
 
There are large research gaps at the crossroads between adaptation and institutional 
economics, and this issue is no exception to that – it hardly features private adaptation and 
operational choice, for instance. Furthermore, there’s a broad range of topics worthwhile 
addressing, that haven’t been included in this special issues. These are: the effects of climate 
change on property rights; a characterization and mapping of structural diversity among 
collective action dilemmas in climate adaptation; and an exploration of the potential 
contribution of evolutionary institutional economics. Let us briefly sketch these topics 
individually. 
 
Property rights are a crucial element in the workings of institutions, which indeed can be 
understood as distributions of entitlements and obligations among actors. Climate impacts 
  
have no understanding of property rights, though, and both Gawel et al. (2016) and Bergsma 
(2017) have shown the distributive implications of adapting to climate change. In a world 
where the (re)distributive implications of adaptation are the norm and not the exception, 
what happens to property rights? Historically, securing property rights has been a key 
stepping stone in advancing economic output (Acemoglu 2005). Institutions such as 
insurance and the pooling of resources have a long history of dealing with hazards and 
hedging property rights against uncertainty, and are indeed being investigated as a form of 
adaptation against climate change. They raise the question whether, as incremental 
solutions, they will suffice, or whether different forms of property rights are going to emerge 
that are resilient against a changing climate and the corresponding adaptations. 
 
It is clear that adaptation particularly at higher scales has a collective-action dimension. 
Prospectively, the matter shall move away from the question whether collective action does 
or does not take place and towards the specificities of collective action arrangements to be 
expected. Roggero and Thiel (2017) provide a first attempt at that. Further advancements, 
though, will require a characterization of the different social dilemmas linked with climate 
adaptation. Villamayor-Tomas (2017) and Oberlack and Eisenack (2017) already move few 
steps in that direction, following the direction shown by Bisaro and Hinkel (2016). 
 
Finally, a promising avenue for the advancement of our present knowledge of institutional 
change processes lies in the cross-fertilization between institutional and evolutionary 
economics. Although inspired from biological processes, evolutionary theory will not make 
up for the present lack of biophysical awareness of the institutional scholarship. Rather than 
that, it envisions a theory of institutional change based on variation, retention and diffusion: 
the mechanisms at the core of Generalized Darwinism (Blyth et al. 2011; Ostrom and Basurto 
2011). Much of the debate there revolves around the role of intelligence, volition and (we 
could add) planned behavior as a source of variation and tinkering (Beinhocker 2011; 
Hodgson and Stoelhorst 2011). From the point of view of this special issue, important 
extensions may be made in terms of climate change, where variation induced by sentient 
agents (actors!) may be able to anticipate those changes in the fitness function potentially 
induced by climate change. 
 
In summary, the aim of this special issue is to establish a constructive and fruitful line of 
intellectual exchange between adaptation scholars and institutional economists. As the 
above has shown, climate adaptation can indeed be explored through institutional 
economics thinking. Doing so fits well within the general agenda of institutional economics. 
It may even lead to a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the role biophysical 
conditions and their change have for those societal mechanisms institutional economics is 
concerned with. 
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